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A short history of India in eight maps

 From The Economist

In his decade in power Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, has centralised the state to an unprecedented extent. Yet his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has failed to attract many voters in the more prosperous south. The regional divergence is not unique to the bjp. Throughout India’s long history, rulers have tried and failed to unite the subcontinent under central authority. The chief reason is India’s diversity, summed up in clichés about dozens of cuisines, hundreds of languages and thousands of gods. The clichés may be trite, but they are also useful. A whirlwind tour through 2,500 years of Indian history helps explain why.

India, Hindi (the language), Hindu (a follower of the religion) and Hindustan (the country) all take their name from the Indus, the mighty river that flows from the Himalayas into the Arabian Sea. Outsiders typically used these names for the subcontinent and its people. A much older name is “Bharat”, used by the subcontinent’s people itself. Scholars believe it was first used in reference to a tribe called Bharata who populated northern India.

The history of pre-independence India is often divided into Hindu, Muslim and British periods. The first ruler to establish a pan-Indian empire, building on the work of his grandfather Chandragupta Maurya, was Ashoka (see map 1), but at unfathomable human cost. Also known as Ashoka the Great, he converted to Buddhism after reckoning with the brutality his territorial expansion had engendered. He remains a revered figure even today for uniting the country and for his largely benevolent rule after converting. His four-headed-lion capital (column head) is the official emblem of the Republic of India, and his “chakra”, or wheel, a Buddhist symbol, sits at the centre of the Indian flag.

The Mauryan Empire boosted economic activity across the subcontinent, but even 24 centuries ago it was clear that a unified idea of India could not be imposed on such a diverse population. Imperial edicts show that Ashoka’s administrators took into account local differences.

The empire broke apart soon after he died, in 232bc. For well over a millennium, India was ruled by a huge variety of kings, chieftains and oligarchies. A new era started in 1192 when Muhammad Ghuri, a Muslim chieftain based in Afghanistan, defeated Prithviraj Chauhan, a Hindu king, near Delhi. Ghuri left behind a slave general, Qutbuddin Aibek, to govern the territories. Upon Ghuri’s death, Aibek declared himself sovereign and established the Delhi Sultanate. His majestic Qutb Minar, a soaring minaret, still stands in Delhi and is one of the symbols of the city.

Muslim empires rose and fell over the next three centuries—too many to include in a “short history”. But one merits mention. Muhammad bin Tughluq of the Tughlaq dynasty, who ruled from 1325 to 1351, expanded his empire to most of the subcontinent, the first ruler since Ashoka to manage the feat (see map 2). To achieve this he established a new capital, Daulatabad, in what is now the western state of Maharashtra, forcibly moving big chunks of his population from Delhi, and burning the houses of those who were slow to pack. Though Muhammad bin Tughluq succeeded in expanding his territory, holding it was a different matter. He spent much of his rule trying to subdue rebellions and rival kings.

By the early 16th century, the subcontinent was once more a patchwork of kingdoms and mini-empires, both Hindu and Muslim (see map 3). In 1526 Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur, a direct descendant of Tamerlane, an Uzbek ruler, on his paternal side and an indirect one of Genghis Khan via his mother, defeated Ibrahim Lodi in the Battle of Panipat near Delhi, marking an important turning-point in Indian history. He lived for just four years after taking Delhi—and in that time complained incessantly. He described India as “a country of few charms” and took issue with the quality of its melons. But he established one of the greatest empires the world has ever seen: the Mughal empire (see map 4).

Babur’s grandson, Akbar, took the empire to great heights and expanded it across the north. He invited scholars and sages from many religions—including Islam, Hinduism, Christianity and Jainism—to his court. His son, Jahangir, and grandson, Shah Jahan, were great patrons of the arts, the latter responsible for the Taj Mahal.

But Akbar’s great-grandson, Aurangzeb, was a puritanical Muslim with little time for syncretism. He imposed discriminatory taxes on Hindus and persecuted certain sects of Muslims. He too established a new provincial capital in today’s Maharashtra and spent the majority of his reign in expansionist mode. He became the third and last ruler of pre-independence India to conquer chunks of the south. After his death the Mughals started a long and ultimately terminal decline.

In 1757 the East India Company, a British corporation with an army, defeated the Nawab of Bengal and took over the province in India’s east. Over the next 100 years it expanded its control of the subcontinent (see map 5). In 1857, after a bloody uprising by disgruntled troops in Company pay and even bloodier reprisals by the eventually victorious British, control was transferred to the Crown, making India an official part of an expanding empire ruled from London.

Yet even this apparently single authority was substantially varied. The British ruled both directly and via subservient local kings. The quality of rule—and the degree of tyranny—varied enormously from place to place. Even in many places under direct British control, the new rulers left existing administrative structures in place, their main interest being the collection of revenue. Some writers attribute present-day disparities in income and wealth across India’s regions in part to the differing revenue-collection systems, which embedded varying degrees of incentives for administrative competence.

The subcontinent achieved independence in 1947. Yet the realisation of a long-standing dream came bundled with the horrors and lasting trauma of partition (see map 6). British India was divided into what is now the Republic of India and what became West and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). When the British departed, only 60% of what was left of India had been ruled directly by them. The remainder was under the rule of 565 kingdoms commonly referred to as “princely states”. Under the terms of partition, each princely state could accede to India, Pakistan or seek independence.

India’s founders, chief among them Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the first home minister, worked night and day to cajole, persuade or threaten local kings into joining India. The Muslim ruler of Junagadh acceded to Pakistan but was run out of his kingdom after his mostly Hindu subjects rebelled. The Hindu king of mostly-Muslim Kashmir dithered, calling Delhi in a panic when Pakistan-backed militias invaded, leading to the first of four Indo-Pakistan wars. With the adoption of a new constitution in 1950, India became a republic, free of the last vestiges of British rule.

The new country was an administrative mess, a patchwork of states and provinces big and small and tiny, none of it remotely rational. India thus undertook the bold and risky project of reorganising state boundaries along linguistic lines (see map 7), both to give diverse peoples a sense of autonomy among their own kind and to tamp down the risk of secessionist movements. In 1961 the Indian army annexed Goa and other Portuguese territories, bringing present-day India close to its final shape as a single political entity (India seized control of Sikkim in 1973 and it formally acceded to the Union in 1975).

India’s internal borders continued to evolve in the decades that followed. In 2000, for example, three new states were created to ease administration, and in 2019 the government dissolved the state of Jammu & Kashmir into two separate “union territories”, which are administered by the centre (see map 8). Its external boundaries are also contested. Most notably, India and Pakistan both claim the entirety of Kashmir and routinely skirmish for territory. And Chinese and Indian troops recently faced off in brutal hand-to-hand combat in Ladakh in 2020, with India said to have lost slivers of territory.

The meaning of “India” has evolved continuously for thousands of years. It will continue to do so as long as its external boundaries remain unsettled. These are difficult problems, but they are also signs of India’s greatest strength: its diversity. The country’s wisest rulers have accommodated it, miraculously holding a vast, poor and improbably democratic country together for nearly 80 years.

Further reading
“Baburnama: Journal of Emperor Babur”, Penguin Classics
“India in the Persianate Age: 1000-1765”, Richard M. Eaton
“The Origin Story of India’s States”, Venkataraghavan Subha Srininavasan
“Early India: From the Origins to ad 1300”, Romila Thapar
“Delhi Darshan: The History and Monuments of India’s Capital”, Giles Tillotson

Editor’s note (April 16th): this piece has been updated to include mention of Bharat

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How to build a Global Currency

From The Economist

Seventy years ago the Indian rupee was often found a long way from home. After India gained independence from Britain, the currency remained in use in sheikhdoms across the Arabian Sea. Until as late as 1970, some employed the Gulf rupee, a currency issued by India’s central bank.

Today the picture is rather different. The rupee accounts for less than 2% of international-currency transactions, even though the Indian economy is the world’s fifth-largest. Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, would like to see the currency span the globe once again. Speaking at the 90th anniversary of the Reserve Bank of India on April 1st, Mr Modi told the central bank’s policymakers to focus on making the rupee more accessible. Historically, however, national leaders have been a lot more likely to express enthusiasm for the idea of making their currency a global one than to enact the reforms required to do so.

Although the American dollar is the undisputed king of currencies, there are many with a global role of their own. The euro, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the dollars of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and Singapore are all examples. These currencies are found in foreign reserves and private portfolios worldwide, and used for both trade and financial transactions. In theory, there is no reason why the rupee should not join the illustrious group.

Having a widely used currency brings sizeable benefits. Demand from overseas investors lowers financing costs for domestic companies, which are no longer compelled to borrow in foreign currencies. Such demand also reduces exchange-rate risks for exporters and importers, who do not need to convert currencies so often when trading, and enables the government to reduce the size of its foreign-exchange reserves.

Some of the foundation stones of an international currency are being laid in India. The country now has assets that foreigners want to buy, making the rupee a potential store of value overseas. In September JPMorgan Chase, a bank, announced that it would include Indian government bonds in its emerging-market index. Bloomberg, a data provider, took the same decision last month. The explosive performance of the country’s stocks, which are up by 37% in dollar terms over the past year, has piqued global interest.

The rupee is also increasingly a unit of account and a medium of exchange for foreigners. Banks from 22 countries have been permitted to open special rupee-denominated accounts, without the usual exchange limits. In August India made its first rupee payment for oil, to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.

Yet China shows how far India has to go. Although Chinese policymakers have been trying to make the yuan a global currency for more than a decade, it still accounts for less than 3% of international trades made via swift, a payments network, outside the euro zone, despite the fact that China accounts for 17% of global gdp. Moreover, 80% of such international yuan transactions occur in Hong Kong. China’s relatively closed capital account, which prevents investments from flowing freely across its borders, is the main obstacle to wider use of its currency. India’s capital account is less closed than it once was, but is still far more sheltered than that of any of the countries with a global currency.

Japan provides a better example. In 1970 it accounted for 7% of global gdp—more than the 4% it does now—and its companies were beginning to make a mark abroad. But the yen was a nonentity. That changed over the following decade: in 1970, 1% of Japan’s exports were invoiced in yen; by the early 1980s, 40% were. In 1989 the yen made up 28% of all foreign-exchange transactions. It still accounts for 16% today.

To make the leap to global-currency status, Japan’s leaders had to transform the country’s economy. They allowed foreigners to hold a wide range of assets, deregulated big financial institutions, and peeled back controls on capital flows and interest rates. These changes disrupted Japan’s export-oriented economic model, and undermined the power of the country’s bureaucrats.

Changes just as far-reaching—and uncomfortable—will be required for any country that now wants to join the top table. Few seem to have the stomach for them at present. Indeed, without American pressure and the threat of tariffs, Japan itself might not have made such reforms. America is not about to lean on India in the same way. The desire for change will have to come from within.

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Is the BJP winning the 2024 Lok Sabha elections?

Shekhar Gupta in The Print


As the combatants ready their manifestos for the 2024 campaign, the first set of opinion polls is with us. I understand the scepticism about news TV channels and the ‘so what else would you expect from these guys’ view among those who support the BJP’s rivals, but some data is better than data-free analysis.

Left to us journalists and pundits who predict poll outcomes after talking at a few dhabas and with three taxi drivers, we could conveniently give victory to our own favourites and then go to sleep happily. If the results are different, there are always the EVMs to blame.

The fact is, you do not even need any pollsters to tell you the BJP is way ahead in this contest. Even as the Opposition’s ambitious INDIA bloc has struggled to maintain cohesion, the BJP has set about repairing and rebuilding the NDA. The passion of the partisan aside, much of the talk within the opposition parties is about where they could limit Narendra Modi, rather than having him voted out of power.

That’s the state of play at this point in time, although the Opposition believes the revelations about the electoral bonds have put some wind in its sails. And the idea of the BJP’s ‘washing machine’ is a campaign pitch with some oomph. Is it powerful enough to turn the Opposition’s fortunes? Most opposition leaders would still look at the picture more soberly. It is about how to ‘limit’ Modi to a ‘reasonable’ number.

An insight into the Opposition’s thinking came in a conversation with the leader of one opposition party across the aisle on an IndiGo flight early in January. The third-generation dynast has inherited a party with a solid caste-based vote bank, albeit in a limited geography. I asked how he looked at the prospects, and whether he believed his caste vote bank would survive Modi’s pull.

The caste vote bank may be generally safe, he said, but when people go out to vote in the Lok Sabha elections, they will see only one choice. “How do you convince them there’s an alternative?” he asked. His party (and the Opposition), he said, was struggling to find an issue that brings a critical mass of people out into the streets. For example, if you raise the Agnipath scheme, only those affected will come to protest. The rest of the voters will be indifferent.

“What’s the solution, then? Has your three-generation politics come to an end?” I asked.

“Well,” he said, “let’s see it like we are in a nuclear winter. All we can do is survive until it thaws. In politics, that would mean preserving your caste vote bank, winning at least a few seats and conserving your resources. Live long enough until times change.”

Prescient, I thought, and very wise, too. Except, just days after this conversation, he left the INDIA bloc and joined the NDA. He probably chose this as a way of dealing with his nuclear winter. At least when and if things change, he will still be in the ring, and up on his feet to weigh new options.

With self-preservation or surviving to fight another day being the topmost thought on the minds of the opposition parties, each one faces different challenges. For some, like Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress, their state governments would be destabilised by any addition to the BJP’s 2019 tally of seats.

The currently embattled Aam Aadmi Party would look to make a bigger statement in Delhi than the wipeout of 2019. For the Uddhav Thackeray-led Shiv Sena (UBT) and Sharad Pawar’s NCP faction, a relative success is essential for survival. For Akhilesh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party and Lalu/Tejashwi Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), a 2019-like performance will make their dream of returning to power in their states that much more improbable.

These parties also have limited avenues for funds. Where they aren’t in power, the taps have remained dry for years and the savings are running out. Those that still rule a state and can ‘persuade’ moneyed people to pay have the ‘agencies’ on their tail. This would scare their prospective donors even more.

All this is about one-state parties. Or maybe one-and-a-half states in the case of AAP. For the Congress, the challenge is of a different order. Of late, it has struggled to maintain cohesion. Between 2014 and 2019, its only achievement was maintaining that rock-solid vote percentage of just about 20 percent. But this does not make enough seats for it to even cross the threshold in the Lok Sabha to get the formal leader of the Opposition status. What is the number it should target to convince its supporters and adversaries that it is a genuine challenger for the future?

The hundred-seat mark would be an interesting thought and can alter Indian politics. But is it realistic? I understand if the Congress officially contests any suggestion other than the idea that it is leading INDIA to a majority, but its leaders are experienced, having tasted victory and defeat. They’d believe that any substantive improvement, any number past 80 seats, would put it on a great footing. This is especially so with the Haryana, Maharashtra and Jharkhand elections to follow soon after.

The results on 4 June will set the momentum for elections in these important states. The BJP faces challenges in each of the three. A Congress tally of 80-plus now would give its allies in Jharkhand and Maharashtra strength. If it fails to reach even that mark, however, it risks losing its pre-eminence as the natural leader in an opposition alliance. A third disaster in a row would mean an upheaval within the party and definitely persuade the other rivals of the BJP to look for alternatives. Some may also decide to take the cue from my fellow traveller to escape the nuclear winter.

Why, then, is the BJP looking so frantic? Why is Modi campaigning as if trying to win power for the first time in 2014? Why this flurry of raids and arrests of opposition leaders, even a serving chief minister? Why does the party look so worried if it is indeed in such a good place in this campaign?

Good questions, and we will explore some answers. The first is that it is simply the nature of the Modi-Shah BJP. For them, every election is to be fought like their life depends on it.

The second, as we wrote in a National Interest four Saturdays ago, is that Modi is now campaigning not just for 2024, but for 2029. What works better for him in that quest than to destroy the Opposition as comprehensively as possible, leaving the survivors to contemplate their future? The Opposition, especially the Congress, is right to fear a one-man/one-party/one-ideology domination of the kind not seen in India yet. And if they don’t like it, they have to convince enough of the voters that this isn’t good for Indian democracy. There isn’t much time left.

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