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Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Wednesday 20 March 2024
Monday 4 March 2024
A Religious Market Theory Explained
Nadeem F Paracha in The Dawn
In 1987, the American sociologists Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge formulated a ‘Religious Market Theory.’ The theory is a critique of the ‘Secularisation Thesis.’ The secularisation thesis was initially developed by the German sociologist Max Weber in the early 20th century. In the next five decades, it was further evolved by numerous scholars.
To Weber, due to modernisation, especially from the late 18th century onwards, societies entered a process of ‘spiritual disenchantment.’ Space for ‘pre-modern’ beliefs in magic, faith and superstition shrank and people began to adopt more rational modes of thinking.
Even non-Western societies started to adopt models of modernisation and, indeed, here as well, the traditional variants of religion began to decline. They were replaced by secularised formations of traditional faiths, framed and monopolised by the state.
But the secularisation thesis came into question when, from the mid-1970s onwards, the exhibition of religiosity, especially in modernised Muslim-majority nation-states, began to grow.
In the 1980s, when religiosity saw an increase in the US as well, Stark and Bainbridge formulated their religious market theory, challenging the secularisation thesis. The religious market theory suggests that when religiosity declines, it eventually revives itself, because the decline opens up spaces for new faiths and modified versions of the old faiths to emerge.
Stark and Bainbridge saw the rise and decline of religiosity as a cycle, which moves like markets do in capitalist settings. Religions which fail to adjust to the needs of changing conditions, fall by the wayside and lose followers. Readjusted religions and new faiths begin to emerge in a scenario where religiosity seems to be receding.
Gradually, though, new and readjusted variants are able to revive interest in faith, by providing services and products that are better suited to meet the needs of changing conditions.
According to Stark and Bainbridge, this cycle produces a diverse collection of faiths, cults, sects and subsects, which compete against each other in the ‘marketplace of faiths’ and improve to attract followers. The religious market theory posits that this renews an interest in faith and religiosity.
In 19th century India, during the complete fall of the Mughal Empire and the mushrooming of British colonialism, the established variants of Islam began to struggle to keep pace with the changing conditions. It seemed that the modernity introduced by the British was rapidly secularising the polity. But as the old religious ethos dwindled, new variants emerged to address the changing needs of India’s Muslims.
On the one hand, new Sunni sects such as Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith sprang up and, on the other, the Ahmadiyya, the Ahl-i-Quran and Muslim Modernism emerged. They competed against each other, promising the most suitable narratives to India’s ‘depressed’ Muslims and, in the process, gathering followers — more importantly, followers who had political and economic clout.
From the mid-19th century till the 1920s, the marketplace of faiths in South Asia flourished with new variations of Islam and Hinduism. The variants were products/brands, and their followers were consumers. This indeed witnessed a renewed interest in religion and religiosity.
However, from the late 1940s, when India split into two nation-states, Bharat and Pakistan, the state in both countries decided to monopolise the marketplace of faiths, through an overarching meta-narrative.
India formulated a nationalist secularism that sought to build a socialist democracy. It was to provide economic services that religious organisations had been offering to attract followers. The state in Pakistan began to shape a nationalist-modernist variant of Islam and it regulated the marketplace of faiths by bringing its shops and products under the state’s control.
According to some contemporary proponents of the religious market theory, the presence of a centralised and ‘official’ faith eschews religious diversity. It nationalises the marketplace of faiths. This causes a decline in religiosity, as has been the case in various Scandinavian countries and in Britain.
The state in India (through nationalist-secularism) and Pakistan (through modernist-nationalist Islam) attempted to do this. Religion did not decline as such, but religiosity did.
In the 1970s, new economic and political challenges emerged in Pakistan and India. These also challenged the nationalisation of the marketplace of faiths. In Pakistan, political elites tried to absorb the alternatives offered by Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. They privatised the marketplace and began to gather fresh followers, who could not find remedies anymore in the centralised state-approved variant.
By the 1980s, the marketplace of faiths was once again booming. In Pakistan, the state continued to try absorbing the new variants by discarding the old modernist variant. But, as the middle class and the lower-middle class segments expanded, they became the most active consumers of new variants, thereby re-energising the marketplace of faiths.
These variants ranged from renewed and modified versions of evangelical Islam, to the more radical versions of Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. Religiosity revived itself.
In India, economic liberalisation weakened the monopoly of the nationalist-secular narrative in the marketplace of faiths. The Indian historian Meera Nanda, in her book The God Market, has closely tracked the trajectory of the expanding elite and middle-income groups in India, from being consumers of the nationalist-secular narrative, to becoming the most prominent consumers of Hindu nationalism — especially after benefitting from the post-1980s ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies.
According to Nanda, these segments, who now exercise increasing economic influence, “re-ritualised and re-enchanted Hinduism.” They now view Hinduism as being inherently compatible with modern economic ideas that guarantee profitability and prosperity. This, too, is how the renewed evangelical variants of Islam peddled their narrative to the elite and middle-income groups in Pakistan.
Consequently, exhibitions of religiosity have witnessed a manifold increase in both the countries. However, within the marketplace of faiths are also variants that are problematic. These include the more reactionary manifestations of faiths. For example, those looking to undermine Muslims in India in a violent manner will shop for variants that aid the consumer to theologically justify acts of violence.
This is also true in Pakistan. There are sectarian and sub-sectarian variants in the marketplace of faiths, which ‘theologically’ validate actions of those who want to use or instigate violence against an opponent in the name of faith.
More worrying is the fact that many urban, ‘educated’ folk, too, buy these variants, especially products (in the shape of narratives) that justify or instigate violence. These are often used to demonise perceived enemies as ‘Ahmadiyya sympathisers,’ or ‘anti-Islam’.
The marketplace of faiths is now almost entirely unregulated. And the state and governments whose job it was to regulate it, too, have become consumers in the marketplace of faiths to justify their own existence.
In 1987, the American sociologists Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge formulated a ‘Religious Market Theory.’ The theory is a critique of the ‘Secularisation Thesis.’ The secularisation thesis was initially developed by the German sociologist Max Weber in the early 20th century. In the next five decades, it was further evolved by numerous scholars.
To Weber, due to modernisation, especially from the late 18th century onwards, societies entered a process of ‘spiritual disenchantment.’ Space for ‘pre-modern’ beliefs in magic, faith and superstition shrank and people began to adopt more rational modes of thinking.
Even non-Western societies started to adopt models of modernisation and, indeed, here as well, the traditional variants of religion began to decline. They were replaced by secularised formations of traditional faiths, framed and monopolised by the state.
But the secularisation thesis came into question when, from the mid-1970s onwards, the exhibition of religiosity, especially in modernised Muslim-majority nation-states, began to grow.
In the 1980s, when religiosity saw an increase in the US as well, Stark and Bainbridge formulated their religious market theory, challenging the secularisation thesis. The religious market theory suggests that when religiosity declines, it eventually revives itself, because the decline opens up spaces for new faiths and modified versions of the old faiths to emerge.
Stark and Bainbridge saw the rise and decline of religiosity as a cycle, which moves like markets do in capitalist settings. Religions which fail to adjust to the needs of changing conditions, fall by the wayside and lose followers. Readjusted religions and new faiths begin to emerge in a scenario where religiosity seems to be receding.
Gradually, though, new and readjusted variants are able to revive interest in faith, by providing services and products that are better suited to meet the needs of changing conditions.
According to Stark and Bainbridge, this cycle produces a diverse collection of faiths, cults, sects and subsects, which compete against each other in the ‘marketplace of faiths’ and improve to attract followers. The religious market theory posits that this renews an interest in faith and religiosity.
In 19th century India, during the complete fall of the Mughal Empire and the mushrooming of British colonialism, the established variants of Islam began to struggle to keep pace with the changing conditions. It seemed that the modernity introduced by the British was rapidly secularising the polity. But as the old religious ethos dwindled, new variants emerged to address the changing needs of India’s Muslims.
On the one hand, new Sunni sects such as Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith sprang up and, on the other, the Ahmadiyya, the Ahl-i-Quran and Muslim Modernism emerged. They competed against each other, promising the most suitable narratives to India’s ‘depressed’ Muslims and, in the process, gathering followers — more importantly, followers who had political and economic clout.
From the mid-19th century till the 1920s, the marketplace of faiths in South Asia flourished with new variations of Islam and Hinduism. The variants were products/brands, and their followers were consumers. This indeed witnessed a renewed interest in religion and religiosity.
However, from the late 1940s, when India split into two nation-states, Bharat and Pakistan, the state in both countries decided to monopolise the marketplace of faiths, through an overarching meta-narrative.
India formulated a nationalist secularism that sought to build a socialist democracy. It was to provide economic services that religious organisations had been offering to attract followers. The state in Pakistan began to shape a nationalist-modernist variant of Islam and it regulated the marketplace of faiths by bringing its shops and products under the state’s control.
According to some contemporary proponents of the religious market theory, the presence of a centralised and ‘official’ faith eschews religious diversity. It nationalises the marketplace of faiths. This causes a decline in religiosity, as has been the case in various Scandinavian countries and in Britain.
The state in India (through nationalist-secularism) and Pakistan (through modernist-nationalist Islam) attempted to do this. Religion did not decline as such, but religiosity did.
In the 1970s, new economic and political challenges emerged in Pakistan and India. These also challenged the nationalisation of the marketplace of faiths. In Pakistan, political elites tried to absorb the alternatives offered by Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. They privatised the marketplace and began to gather fresh followers, who could not find remedies anymore in the centralised state-approved variant.
By the 1980s, the marketplace of faiths was once again booming. In Pakistan, the state continued to try absorbing the new variants by discarding the old modernist variant. But, as the middle class and the lower-middle class segments expanded, they became the most active consumers of new variants, thereby re-energising the marketplace of faiths.
These variants ranged from renewed and modified versions of evangelical Islam, to the more radical versions of Sunni and Shia sects and subsects. Religiosity revived itself.
In India, economic liberalisation weakened the monopoly of the nationalist-secular narrative in the marketplace of faiths. The Indian historian Meera Nanda, in her book The God Market, has closely tracked the trajectory of the expanding elite and middle-income groups in India, from being consumers of the nationalist-secular narrative, to becoming the most prominent consumers of Hindu nationalism — especially after benefitting from the post-1980s ‘neo-liberal’ economic policies.
According to Nanda, these segments, who now exercise increasing economic influence, “re-ritualised and re-enchanted Hinduism.” They now view Hinduism as being inherently compatible with modern economic ideas that guarantee profitability and prosperity. This, too, is how the renewed evangelical variants of Islam peddled their narrative to the elite and middle-income groups in Pakistan.
Consequently, exhibitions of religiosity have witnessed a manifold increase in both the countries. However, within the marketplace of faiths are also variants that are problematic. These include the more reactionary manifestations of faiths. For example, those looking to undermine Muslims in India in a violent manner will shop for variants that aid the consumer to theologically justify acts of violence.
This is also true in Pakistan. There are sectarian and sub-sectarian variants in the marketplace of faiths, which ‘theologically’ validate actions of those who want to use or instigate violence against an opponent in the name of faith.
More worrying is the fact that many urban, ‘educated’ folk, too, buy these variants, especially products (in the shape of narratives) that justify or instigate violence. These are often used to demonise perceived enemies as ‘Ahmadiyya sympathisers,’ or ‘anti-Islam’.
The marketplace of faiths is now almost entirely unregulated. And the state and governments whose job it was to regulate it, too, have become consumers in the marketplace of faiths to justify their own existence.
Sunday 3 March 2024
Sunday 11 February 2024
Friday 15 December 2023
Tuesday 12 December 2023
Friday 22 September 2023
Thursday 21 September 2023
Sunday 17 September 2023
Saturday 16 September 2023
Sunday 10 September 2023
A Level Economics: What is a Failed State?
Nadeem Paracha in The Dawn
On YouTube, there are numerous videos on ‘failed states’. Those posted by certain American news outlets almost always describe Russia as a failed or failing state. Similarly, videos produced by Indian media outlets often refer to Pakistan as a failed/failing state. Then there are also some videos produced in China which ‘predict’ the collapse of the American state structure, and many American videos that speak of ‘China’s coming collapse’.
So what is a failed state?
There are various theories about what constitutes state failure, but most political scientists and economists agree on two major symptoms of this failure. The first is when the state loses its ability to establish authority over its territory and citizens, and is unable to protect the country’s sovereignty. Secondly, state failure also constitutes the state’s inability to provide basic necessities to its citizens and when a country’s governing institutions become ineffective.
However, according to foreign policy experts such as the Norwegian Morten Bøås, the application of the term ‘failed state’ is largely political in nature. A country threatened by another country whose state is facing a crisis, often labels it as a failed or failing state. This is why to the US, at the moment, Russia is a ‘failing state’ and to India, so is Pakistan.
Recently, Chinese propaganda has claimed that the US is on the brink of state failure, especially after the ‘backsliding’ that American democracy witnessed during the Trump presidency. It’s politics.
The definition of what constitutes a ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ state may be determined by geopolitical interests, but the internal role of extractive and exclusivist institutions cannot be ignored
But does this mean that there are no failed states at all? There are. Most political scientists agree that Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, DR Congo and Sudan are failed states because state authority in these countries has almost completely collapsed. Outside the confines of areas in which the state does have some authority left, ‘non-state actors’ hold sway. Poverty, political chaos and violence are rampant. There is no presence of a cohesive state here.
Even though one may agree with men such as Bøås that ‘failed state’ is a political term applied for propaganda purposes to justify external armed intervention or to impose economic sanctions, this does not mean that, apart from the more blatant examples of failed states, other countries are entirely safe from becoming another Afghanistan or Somalia.
Most states, even in developed countries, often exhibit some symptoms of state failure. But the symptoms are particularly intense in developing countries, where there is a greater chance of the state failing.
In Pakistan, when Islamist militants had occupied vast swaths of land in the early 2010s, and the state seemed ill-equipped or even reluctant to reestablish its writ in these regions, many voices inside and outside the country warned that Pakistan was heading towards state failure.
The warning was not exaggerated. However, the state too was conscious of this. It finally responded by conducting an unprecedented military operation. Between 2014 and 2017, it was able to oust the militants from areas where they had established parallel governing systems, mostly based on outright terror.
But military action alone against forces challenging the writ of the state is not enough. In the book Why Nations Fail, the economists James A. Robinson and Daron Acemoglu write that nations fail not because they lack abundant natural resources or are located in volatile regions. One of the most prominent reasons that states fail is because of ‘extractive’ political and economic institutions.
Nation states with inclusive institutions prosper because these institutions do not restrict the economic and political participation of all citizens. It does not matter what race or religion a citizen belongs to, they are encouraged to bolster the country’s, and their own, economic ambitions.
Extractive institutions go the other way. Economic and political elites accumulate power and wealth for themselves from those who can’t find a voice or place in the extractive institutions. Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy. But this democracy is largely extractive and exclusivist. Its exclusivist nature is deeper than just ‘elite capture’. This is so because the non-Sunni and non-Muslim communities too are kept at an arm’s length, because they do not adhere to the definition of Islam defined by the Constitution. Some are even outrightly repressed.
A powerful state institution in Pakistan, the military, sees itself above this nature of exclusivity. Yet, from the 1980s onwards, it was the military that further strengthened extractive and exclusivist policies and even used exclusivist forces to meet its own political ambitions. The parliament and a politicised military have both contributed in severely limiting the participation of the diverse talent required to construct robust economic and political institutions.
The continuing extractive policies have now instigated a clash within the extractive elites, both civilian and military. The extractive elites benefitted the most through exclusivist policies. On the other hand, those who are kept out because of their faith, sect, ethnicity or class have been severely marginalised and are just mere spectators of an ongoing tussle for power between the two factions of the extractive forces.
The ‘anti-military’ riots on May 9 and 10 were an example of one extractive group trying to push back the other. So, the crisis of the state that Pakistan is facing today is also about a crisis within elite groups. A new election alone won’t resolve the crisis. Pakistan’s democracy is still navigated by an exclusivist constitution, which can actually deepen the crisis.
I believe, alarmed by such a possibility, the military is contemplating a Hobbesian route. In his highly influential book The Leviathan, the 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes posited that, in exchange for getting protection from violence, war, chaos, poverty and crime, the citizens are required to delegate a large degree of power to a sovereign state.
The exchange may also require the citizens to relinquish certain rights, so that the sovereign can work freely to guarantee the economic and political security of the citizens without any hindrance.
Indeed, this is clearly an authoritarian view, but Hobbes does warn the sovereign that the failure to do so is likely to cause state failure. On May 9 and 10, the extractive faction that the military was once the architect of, tried to usurp power by rationalising its actions as ‘pro-democracy’ and supported by ‘civil society’.
I believe that, even if and when electoral democracy returns, the Hobbesian route will continue to be taken, because the military is now convinced that anything else is bound to put the state on the brink of failure.
On YouTube, there are numerous videos on ‘failed states’. Those posted by certain American news outlets almost always describe Russia as a failed or failing state. Similarly, videos produced by Indian media outlets often refer to Pakistan as a failed/failing state. Then there are also some videos produced in China which ‘predict’ the collapse of the American state structure, and many American videos that speak of ‘China’s coming collapse’.
So what is a failed state?
There are various theories about what constitutes state failure, but most political scientists and economists agree on two major symptoms of this failure. The first is when the state loses its ability to establish authority over its territory and citizens, and is unable to protect the country’s sovereignty. Secondly, state failure also constitutes the state’s inability to provide basic necessities to its citizens and when a country’s governing institutions become ineffective.
However, according to foreign policy experts such as the Norwegian Morten Bøås, the application of the term ‘failed state’ is largely political in nature. A country threatened by another country whose state is facing a crisis, often labels it as a failed or failing state. This is why to the US, at the moment, Russia is a ‘failing state’ and to India, so is Pakistan.
Recently, Chinese propaganda has claimed that the US is on the brink of state failure, especially after the ‘backsliding’ that American democracy witnessed during the Trump presidency. It’s politics.
The definition of what constitutes a ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ state may be determined by geopolitical interests, but the internal role of extractive and exclusivist institutions cannot be ignored
But does this mean that there are no failed states at all? There are. Most political scientists agree that Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, DR Congo and Sudan are failed states because state authority in these countries has almost completely collapsed. Outside the confines of areas in which the state does have some authority left, ‘non-state actors’ hold sway. Poverty, political chaos and violence are rampant. There is no presence of a cohesive state here.
Even though one may agree with men such as Bøås that ‘failed state’ is a political term applied for propaganda purposes to justify external armed intervention or to impose economic sanctions, this does not mean that, apart from the more blatant examples of failed states, other countries are entirely safe from becoming another Afghanistan or Somalia.
Most states, even in developed countries, often exhibit some symptoms of state failure. But the symptoms are particularly intense in developing countries, where there is a greater chance of the state failing.
In Pakistan, when Islamist militants had occupied vast swaths of land in the early 2010s, and the state seemed ill-equipped or even reluctant to reestablish its writ in these regions, many voices inside and outside the country warned that Pakistan was heading towards state failure.
The warning was not exaggerated. However, the state too was conscious of this. It finally responded by conducting an unprecedented military operation. Between 2014 and 2017, it was able to oust the militants from areas where they had established parallel governing systems, mostly based on outright terror.
But military action alone against forces challenging the writ of the state is not enough. In the book Why Nations Fail, the economists James A. Robinson and Daron Acemoglu write that nations fail not because they lack abundant natural resources or are located in volatile regions. One of the most prominent reasons that states fail is because of ‘extractive’ political and economic institutions.
Nation states with inclusive institutions prosper because these institutions do not restrict the economic and political participation of all citizens. It does not matter what race or religion a citizen belongs to, they are encouraged to bolster the country’s, and their own, economic ambitions.
Extractive institutions go the other way. Economic and political elites accumulate power and wealth for themselves from those who can’t find a voice or place in the extractive institutions. Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy. But this democracy is largely extractive and exclusivist. Its exclusivist nature is deeper than just ‘elite capture’. This is so because the non-Sunni and non-Muslim communities too are kept at an arm’s length, because they do not adhere to the definition of Islam defined by the Constitution. Some are even outrightly repressed.
A powerful state institution in Pakistan, the military, sees itself above this nature of exclusivity. Yet, from the 1980s onwards, it was the military that further strengthened extractive and exclusivist policies and even used exclusivist forces to meet its own political ambitions. The parliament and a politicised military have both contributed in severely limiting the participation of the diverse talent required to construct robust economic and political institutions.
The continuing extractive policies have now instigated a clash within the extractive elites, both civilian and military. The extractive elites benefitted the most through exclusivist policies. On the other hand, those who are kept out because of their faith, sect, ethnicity or class have been severely marginalised and are just mere spectators of an ongoing tussle for power between the two factions of the extractive forces.
The ‘anti-military’ riots on May 9 and 10 were an example of one extractive group trying to push back the other. So, the crisis of the state that Pakistan is facing today is also about a crisis within elite groups. A new election alone won’t resolve the crisis. Pakistan’s democracy is still navigated by an exclusivist constitution, which can actually deepen the crisis.
I believe, alarmed by such a possibility, the military is contemplating a Hobbesian route. In his highly influential book The Leviathan, the 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes posited that, in exchange for getting protection from violence, war, chaos, poverty and crime, the citizens are required to delegate a large degree of power to a sovereign state.
The exchange may also require the citizens to relinquish certain rights, so that the sovereign can work freely to guarantee the economic and political security of the citizens without any hindrance.
Indeed, this is clearly an authoritarian view, but Hobbes does warn the sovereign that the failure to do so is likely to cause state failure. On May 9 and 10, the extractive faction that the military was once the architect of, tried to usurp power by rationalising its actions as ‘pro-democracy’ and supported by ‘civil society’.
I believe that, even if and when electoral democracy returns, the Hobbesian route will continue to be taken, because the military is now convinced that anything else is bound to put the state on the brink of failure.
Wednesday 16 August 2023
Saturday 12 August 2023
A level Economics: 'If Governments can find money to fight wars, surely they can find money for health and education'
ChatGPT
Governments around the world face the constant challenge of allocating limited resources to a wide array of priorities, ranging from defense and infrastructure to education and healthcare. A common sentiment expressed by critics is encapsulated in the quote: "If tomorrow there's a war, won't the government find the money to fight it? If yes, then surely the government can find the money for schools and hospitals." This argument questions the allocation of funds, especially in scenarios where governments allocate substantial resources to war efforts while supposedly neglecting essential social services. However, the issue is multifaceted, involving factors such as government priorities, opportunity costs, economic considerations, and budget deficits.
1. Government Priorities and Public Demand: Governments allocate funds based on perceived priorities, which are often influenced by national security concerns and public demand. In times of conflict, the urgency of defense may lead governments to prioritize military expenditures. Similarly, public demand for improved education and healthcare can drive funding decisions in those sectors. For example, the implementation of universal healthcare systems in various countries illustrates the power of public demand in shaping government priorities.
2. Opportunity Costs and Resource Allocation: The concept of opportunity costs plays a crucial role in resource allocation. When resources are directed towards one endeavor, they are inevitably unavailable for other pursuits. The decision to allocate substantial funds to war efforts might come at the expense of investing in education, healthcare, and infrastructure. This trade-off underscores the challenge governments face when balancing immediate needs with long-term societal benefits.
3. Economic and Political Factors: Economic considerations and political dynamics further complicate funding decisions. Governments might fund war efforts by borrowing money, leading to increased budget deficits and national debt. These financial burdens can have ripple effects on the overall economy, affecting long-term prospects for social programs. Furthermore, political pressures and lobbying can sway funding allocations, sometimes diverting resources away from essential services.
4. Budget Deficits and National Debt: The argument in the quote overlooks the implications of budget deficits and mounting national debt. While governments might "find the money" for certain endeavors, such as war, these actions often result in deficits when expenditures exceed revenues. The accumulation of deficits contributes to national debt, which can lead to higher interest payments and limit a government's capacity to fund essential services. This complex relationship underscores the need for prudent financial management.
5. Real-World Examples: Historical and contemporary examples highlight the interplay of these factors. The Cold War saw both the United States and the Soviet Union allocating substantial resources to military endeavors while neglecting certain domestic needs. In recent times, countries like Greece faced severe economic challenges due to unsustainable levels of debt, impacting their ability to fund public services effectively.
The quote that questions government funding priorities in relation to war and essential services encapsulates a sentiment shared by many. However, the issue is far more intricate than a simple comparison suggests. The allocation of funds involves intricate considerations, including government priorities, opportunity costs, economic factors, and budget deficits. While the ability to "find the money" exists, the long-term implications of such decisions on national debt, economic stability, and societal well-being must be carefully weighed. To achieve a balanced society that addresses both defense and fundamental needs, governments must navigate these complexities with wisdom and foresight.
--- Pakistan a case study
Pakistan's allocation of resources to defense expenditure in comparison to social needs is a topic of ongoing debate. The quote, "If tomorrow there's a war, won't the government find the money to fight it? If yes, then surely the government can find the money for schools and hospitals," sheds light on this issue. This essay delves into Pakistan's defense spending, its impact on social services, and provides a comparative analysis of defense expenditure among Pakistan and its neighboring countries.
1. Pakistan's Defense Expenditure and Its Impact: Pakistan's strategic position in a volatile region has historically driven high defense expenditures. In 2020, Pakistan allocated approximately 18% of its total government expenditure to defense, according to SIPRI. While safeguarding national security is crucial, this allocation has implications for addressing social needs.
2. Social Services and Comparative Analysis: Investing in education and healthcare is essential for sustainable development. However, in comparison to its neighbors, Pakistan's expenditure on social services often falls short. Let's consider a comparative analysis of defense expenditure as a percentage of the budget for the year 2020 among Pakistan and its neighbors:
| Country | Defense Expenditure as % of Budget (2020) | Absolute Defense Expenditure (Million USD) |
|---|---|---|
| Pakistan | ~18% | ~$10,361 |
| India | ~16% | ~$65,861 |
| China | ~19% | ~$261,697 |
| Afghanistan | ~4% | ~$174 |
| Iran | ~15% | ~$14,051 |
3. Comparative Analysis Insights:
- Pakistan's defense spending as a percentage of its budget is relatively high, but China's and Iran's are also substantial due to regional dynamics and security concerns.
- Afghanistan's low defense spending reflects its post-conflict state, focusing on reconstruction and nation-building.
- India's allocation, while slightly lower than Pakistan's, has still been significant due to long-standing geopolitical tensions.
4. Balancing Defense and Social Priorities: Pakistan's allocation to defense must be seen in the context of security challenges. However, the comparative analysis highlights the need for balanced resource allocation. While defense is crucial, an equitable allocation to education, healthcare, and other social services is equally important for sustainable development.
5. Real-World Example: Social Development in Neighboring Countries: India's advancements in sectors like information technology showcase the potential of balanced resource allocation. China's rapid economic growth has been fueled by investments in education, infrastructure, and healthcare. These examples emphasize the need for Pakistan to strike a balance between defense and social development.
Pakistan's allocation of resources to defense versus social needs is a complex issue influenced by historical, geopolitical, and security factors. While safeguarding national security is paramount, the comparative analysis indicates room for rebalancing resources. A comprehensive approach that considers both defense and social development can lead to a more stable and prosperous Pakistan. As the nation moves forward, a pragmatic allocation of resources that addresses security needs while investing in education, healthcare, and infrastructure is essential to fulfill the aspirations of its citizens. The quote's essence resonates, reminding governments to judiciously allocate resources for both immediate security and long-term societal well-being.
---
Also, let's examine how the comparative strategic choices made by Pakistan's neighbors have resulted in growth while Pakistan faces certain challenges. It's important to note that the situations in these countries are influenced by a multitude of factors beyond strategic choices alone.
India's Economic Diversification and Technological Innovation: India has pursued a strategy of economic diversification and technological innovation. By investing in sectors such as information technology, pharmaceuticals, and services, India has managed to achieve robust economic growth. Additionally, India's focus on education and research has produced a skilled workforce that contributes to its economic development.
China's Comprehensive Development Initiatives: China's strategy of comprehensive development initiatives, including its Belt and Road Initiative, has facilitated economic growth and global influence. By investing in infrastructure projects and building strong international trade ties, China has positioned itself as a global economic powerhouse. This strategic approach has allowed China to leverage its resources effectively.
Afghanistan's Complex Challenges and Regional Instability: Afghanistan's situation stands in contrast due to decades of conflict, political instability, and external interventions. The absence of a coherent and stable government, compounded by geopolitical complexities, has hindered its growth. The strategic choices of various actors, both internal and external, have contributed to the challenges Afghanistan faces today.
Pakistan's Strategic Choices and Economic Challenges: Pakistan's allocation of substantial resources to defense, driven by regional security concerns, has at times diverted resources away from economic development and social services. While defense is important, a disproportionate focus on it, along with internal political challenges and terrorism-related issues, has hindered economic growth. In recent years, the structural and fiscal constraints of the economy have added to the challenges.
Comparative strategic choices highlight the impact of long-term policy decisions on economic growth and stability. While India and China have prioritized economic diversification, technological advancement, and international trade, Pakistan's security-focused strategy has at times hindered its ability to allocate resources effectively for economic development. Afghanistan's unique challenges stem from decades of conflict and geopolitical complexities.
It's crucial to recognize that each country's circumstances are unique, and various internal and external factors contribute to their growth trajectories. While strategic choices play a role, historical context, geopolitical dynamics, governance, and regional stability also significantly impact the outcomes. For Pakistan, diversifying its strategic choices to strike a better balance between defense and socio-economic development could potentially lead to enhanced growth and stability, aligned with the experiences of its neighbors.
Tuesday 8 August 2023
Understanding Al-Taqiyya
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Al-Taqiyya is an Islamic concept that allows Muslims to conceal their true beliefs or actions in certain situations, particularly when their safety or well-being is at risk. This practice is most commonly associated with Shia Islam but can also be found in some Sunni traditions. Al-Taqiyya is often misunderstood and misinterpreted, leading to misconceptions about its purpose and implications.
The primary idea behind al-Taqiyya is to protect oneself or others from harm, especially in situations where revealing one's true beliefs could lead to persecution, imprisonment, or even death. It's a strategy of self-preservation that doesn't necessarily involve deception for personal gain but rather for survival. Al-Taqiyya is not an obligation in Islam, but it becomes permissible when one's life or safety is threatened due to their religious beliefs.
Muslims practice al-Taqiyya primarily as a means of self-preservation in situations where their safety, well-being, or life is at risk due to their religious beliefs or identity. Al-Taqiyya allows individuals to conceal their true beliefs or practices temporarily in order to avoid harm, persecution, or danger. Here are some reasons why Muslims might practice al-Taqiyya:
Protection from Persecution: In certain historical and contemporary contexts, Muslims, particularly minority sects like Shia Muslims, have faced persecution and discrimination due to their beliefs. Al-Taqiyya enables them to protect themselves from harm by concealing their true religious affiliation or practices.
Maintaining Life and Safety: Al-Taqiyya can be used when an individual's life or physical safety is at stake. If openly identifying as a Muslim could lead to harm or danger, a person might choose to hide their religious identity temporarily until the threat subsides.
Preserving Harmony: In situations where revealing one's true beliefs could lead to conflict or tension within a community or family, al-Taqiyya might be practiced to maintain harmony and avoid unnecessary strife.
Living in Non-Muslim Societies: Muslims living in predominantly non-Muslim societies might choose to practice al-Taqiyya to avoid misunderstandings, discrimination, or potential backlash from the majority population.
Avoiding Extremist Threats: In some cases, Muslims might use al-Taqiyya to protect themselves from threats posed by extremist individuals or groups who target those they consider to be "heretical" or not adhering to their specific interpretation of Islam.
It's important to note that al-Taqiyya is not intended to promote deception or manipulation for personal gain. It is a practice rooted in the principle of protecting oneself or others from harm, particularly in situations where religious beliefs are under threat. Al-Taqiyya is not an obligation in Islam but is rather a concession allowed in cases of necessity. It is also a topic of debate among scholars, with differing opinions on when and how it should be applied.
Using the term "al-Taqiyya" to describe Pakistanis praising India or its economy would likely be an inappropriate and misleading application of the concept. Al-Taqiyya is primarily concerned with concealing one's true beliefs or practices in situations of danger or threat to protect oneself from harm. It is rooted in religious contexts and is not meant to describe casual behavior or actions.
When Pakistanis praise India or its economy, it can stem from a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with al-Taqiyya. People's opinions and behaviors are influenced by various factors, such as political considerations, personal experiences, economic analyses, diplomatic goals, or even genuine appreciation for certain aspects of another country.
It's important to avoid misusing or overgeneralizing concepts like al-Taqiyya to label behaviors that might have different motivations. Applying such terms inaccurately can perpetuate stereotypes and misunderstandings. Instead, it's better to approach people's actions and expressions with an open mind and seek to understand the complex factors that influence their perspectives.
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