Showing posts with label pharmaceutical. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pharmaceutical. Show all posts
Monday 20 May 2019
Wednesday 27 December 2017
How India rejects bad patents
Feroz Ali & Sudarsan Rajagopal In The Hindu
In 2005, India made some remarkable amendments to the Indian Patents Act of 1970, to keep medicines affordable in the country. Since then we have faced a significant blowback not just from the global pharmaceutical industry but also from developed world including from the U.S. and the European Union.
At the heart of the matter are the strong standards for patents which India introduced to promote genuine innovation across all fields of technology, in perfect compliance with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) norms. In contrast, developed countries have weaker standards as a result of incessant lobbying by corporate behemoths. Twelve years later, we now know what it means: India rejects bad patents in far greater number than developed countries.
The background
The findings of a new study by us which examined all 1,723 pharmaceutical applications rejected by the Indian Patent Office (IPO) between 2009 and 2016 have been an eye-opener.
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, a provision introduced to restrict the patenting of new forms of known pharmaceutical substances, became the subject of international attention after its use in rejecting a patent application by Novartis for the anti-cancer drug, Gleevec. We found that exceptions to patentability in Section 3 of the Act, which includes Section 3(d), were responsible for 65% of all rejected pharmaceutical patent applications.
Over its short lifetime, Section 3(d) has survived a challenge to its constitutionality before the Madras High Court, and Novartis’s fight against the rejection of its patent that went to the Supreme Court. Both courts ruled decisively to uphold the legality of Section 3(d). The United States Trade Representative has also repeatedly rebuked India for this provision in its Special 301 Report, despite its perfect compliance with WTO norms. While the world’s attention is still fixed on this legal experiment that the Indian Parliament introduced into law, there has been a dearth of information on how the IPO has applied Section 3(d). We found that it filters the bad from the good, with the lowest possible administrative and financial burden.
Rejected using Section 3(d)
An astonishing 45% of all rejected pharmaceutical patent applications cited Section 3(d) as a reason for rejection: the applications were identified as mere variants of known compounds that lacked a demonstrable increase in therapeutic value.
Between 1995 and 2005, prior to our new law, India provided a temporary measure to receive patent applications for pharmaceutical products at the IPO, called the mailbox system. Though introduced in 2005, the use of Section 3(d) gradually increased from 2009 when mailbox applications were examined. The spike coincides with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Novartis case, in April 2013. It would appear that this judgment provided legal certainty to Indian patent law in general, and Section 3(d) in particular, enabling the IPO to weed out trivial innovations.
At the patent office
In the last decade, we found that the IPO rejected about 95% of all pharmaceutical patent applications on its own. Only 5% were through the intervention of a third party, such as a pre-grant opponent. Our basic patentability criteria, that the invention should be new, involve an inventive step (also known as non-obviousness), and should be capable of industrial application, were the most frequently used grounds for rejection, followed by the exceptions to patentability grounds in Section 3.
Section 3(d) invaluably equips the IPO with a yardstick to evaluate applications that are merely trivial innovations over existing technology. In cases where the invention is a variant of a known substance, the criterion for patentability is proof of a necessary improvement in its performance for its designated use, i.e., increased efficacy. In the context of pharmaceuticals, as was the case involving Novartis, this translates to evidence of an improvement in therapeutic efficacy. In other words, trivial innovation must result in a far better product in order to qualify for patent protection.
Within the arcane world of patent law, an argument against provisions such as Section 3(d) is that it is no more than an extension of one of the basic requirements of patentability: non-obviousness. Certainly, for an application to be deemed non-obvious, it has to establish a technical advance over what was known before.
But non-obviousness standards are more effectively applied in invalidity proceedings before a court of law than by officials at the IPO. The advantage that a provision such as Section 3(d) provides is the ability to question an application at the IPO itself without having to go through expensive and time-consuming litigation. The high cost of litigation poses significant barriers. Cases are often settled before reaching a conclusion, in pay-for-delay settlements negotiated by patent owners, where generic manufacturers are essentially paid to stay off the market. Patent litigation is expensive, but it is the patient who eventually pays a higher price — by being subject to exorbitant medicine prices, driven by the unmerited exclusivity that bad patents create.
As a check
Without Section 3(d), the Indian public would have to bear the burden of invalidating a bad patent through litigation.
India is certainly not alone in facing two connected challenges: constrained government budgets and urgent public health needs. As Section 3(d) has been efficient in separating the bad patents from the good in India, it would be a wise move for other developing countries, grappling with similar challenges, to incorporate similar provisions in their law.
In 2005, India made some remarkable amendments to the Indian Patents Act of 1970, to keep medicines affordable in the country. Since then we have faced a significant blowback not just from the global pharmaceutical industry but also from developed world including from the U.S. and the European Union.
At the heart of the matter are the strong standards for patents which India introduced to promote genuine innovation across all fields of technology, in perfect compliance with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) norms. In contrast, developed countries have weaker standards as a result of incessant lobbying by corporate behemoths. Twelve years later, we now know what it means: India rejects bad patents in far greater number than developed countries.
The background
The findings of a new study by us which examined all 1,723 pharmaceutical applications rejected by the Indian Patent Office (IPO) between 2009 and 2016 have been an eye-opener.
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, a provision introduced to restrict the patenting of new forms of known pharmaceutical substances, became the subject of international attention after its use in rejecting a patent application by Novartis for the anti-cancer drug, Gleevec. We found that exceptions to patentability in Section 3 of the Act, which includes Section 3(d), were responsible for 65% of all rejected pharmaceutical patent applications.
Over its short lifetime, Section 3(d) has survived a challenge to its constitutionality before the Madras High Court, and Novartis’s fight against the rejection of its patent that went to the Supreme Court. Both courts ruled decisively to uphold the legality of Section 3(d). The United States Trade Representative has also repeatedly rebuked India for this provision in its Special 301 Report, despite its perfect compliance with WTO norms. While the world’s attention is still fixed on this legal experiment that the Indian Parliament introduced into law, there has been a dearth of information on how the IPO has applied Section 3(d). We found that it filters the bad from the good, with the lowest possible administrative and financial burden.
Rejected using Section 3(d)
An astonishing 45% of all rejected pharmaceutical patent applications cited Section 3(d) as a reason for rejection: the applications were identified as mere variants of known compounds that lacked a demonstrable increase in therapeutic value.
Between 1995 and 2005, prior to our new law, India provided a temporary measure to receive patent applications for pharmaceutical products at the IPO, called the mailbox system. Though introduced in 2005, the use of Section 3(d) gradually increased from 2009 when mailbox applications were examined. The spike coincides with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Novartis case, in April 2013. It would appear that this judgment provided legal certainty to Indian patent law in general, and Section 3(d) in particular, enabling the IPO to weed out trivial innovations.
At the patent office
In the last decade, we found that the IPO rejected about 95% of all pharmaceutical patent applications on its own. Only 5% were through the intervention of a third party, such as a pre-grant opponent. Our basic patentability criteria, that the invention should be new, involve an inventive step (also known as non-obviousness), and should be capable of industrial application, were the most frequently used grounds for rejection, followed by the exceptions to patentability grounds in Section 3.
Section 3(d) invaluably equips the IPO with a yardstick to evaluate applications that are merely trivial innovations over existing technology. In cases where the invention is a variant of a known substance, the criterion for patentability is proof of a necessary improvement in its performance for its designated use, i.e., increased efficacy. In the context of pharmaceuticals, as was the case involving Novartis, this translates to evidence of an improvement in therapeutic efficacy. In other words, trivial innovation must result in a far better product in order to qualify for patent protection.
Within the arcane world of patent law, an argument against provisions such as Section 3(d) is that it is no more than an extension of one of the basic requirements of patentability: non-obviousness. Certainly, for an application to be deemed non-obvious, it has to establish a technical advance over what was known before.
But non-obviousness standards are more effectively applied in invalidity proceedings before a court of law than by officials at the IPO. The advantage that a provision such as Section 3(d) provides is the ability to question an application at the IPO itself without having to go through expensive and time-consuming litigation. The high cost of litigation poses significant barriers. Cases are often settled before reaching a conclusion, in pay-for-delay settlements negotiated by patent owners, where generic manufacturers are essentially paid to stay off the market. Patent litigation is expensive, but it is the patient who eventually pays a higher price — by being subject to exorbitant medicine prices, driven by the unmerited exclusivity that bad patents create.
As a check
Without Section 3(d), the Indian public would have to bear the burden of invalidating a bad patent through litigation.
India is certainly not alone in facing two connected challenges: constrained government budgets and urgent public health needs. As Section 3(d) has been efficient in separating the bad patents from the good in India, it would be a wise move for other developing countries, grappling with similar challenges, to incorporate similar provisions in their law.
Thursday 5 June 2014
The Indian Pharmaceutical Sector
By Jill E. Sackman, PhD,Michael Kuchenreuther
Biopharma companies should not overlook India's growing market.
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India, a member of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), is much more comparable to the United States in terms of market size and must be included in this list of promising potential markets for global pharmaceutical manufacturers. Recent changes in India’s population and economy have contributed to a shift in the country’s epidemiological profile towards ‘lifestyle’ diseases that are more prevalent in Western markets. Such changes have increased the demand for better healthcare and for medications that address chronic diseases. Furthermore, India’s own pharmaceutical industry, a recognized world leader in the production of generic drugs, offers manufacturing expertise to organizations looking to outsource or create networks of collaboration and discovery. However, a more granular assessment of India’s pharmaceutical market reveals growing concerns over patent protection, price capping, quality, and safety. Understanding this country’s complex market dynamics will be crucial for manufacturers exploring new opportunities for growth in India.
India health and pharmaceutical market overview
India is the second most populous country in the world with about 1.27 billion people, and is projected to surpass China by 2028 (1). As the Indian population has continued to grow in recent years, so too has the country’s economy. Over the past decade, India’s economy grew above the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average, which can be attributed to rising average income levels, an expanding middle class, and a drive toward urbanization (2). These socio-economic changes are contributing to a significant shift in India’s epidemiological profile. With working-age adults accounting for the majority of the overall population and more people becoming affluent and living longer, Indian health service users are facing increasing challenges associated with the prevention and treatment of chronic diseases such as obesity, heart disease, stroke, cancer, and diabetes (3).
At the same time, India continues to be challenged by a range of infectious disorders. Despite economic advancements, significant income inequality still exists throughout the country. In fact, per capita gross national income in India was only $3,391 in 2012 when adjusted by purchasing power parity (compared to $50,000 in US) (4). In rural areas, where two-thirds of the nation’s citizens are located, hundreds of millions of people are still living in severe poverty, and vaccination coverage for children remains poor.
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Approximately 243 million people are covered by different forms of government-sponsored insurance schemes while approximately 55 million rely on commercial insurers (5). With the vast majority of people in India uninsured, out-of-pocket payments are among the highest in the world. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 70% of Indians are spending their entire out-of-pocket income on medicines and healthcare services (6). On top of this, most insurance plans only provide coverage for inpatient healthcare services and do not include coverage for outpatient treatments, including prescription medicines. Thus, it is no surprise that approximately 90% of India’s pharmaceutical market is currently made up of branded generic drugs (7).
Against this backdrop, India’s Ministry of Health has been focused on improving access to healthcare facilities, increasing population coverage by way of healthcare insurance, and creating initiatives for the prevention and early stage management of chronic diseases. In 2012, as part of the country’s 12th Five-Year Plan, the government proposed to double its public expenditure on healthcare to 2-3% of GDP in an effort to boost local access and affordability to quality healthcare. In light of these efforts, the Indian healthcare industry as a whole is expected to reach $158 billion by 2017 (8).
India’s pharmaceutical market accounts for about 10% of the global pharmaceutical industry in terms of volume and represents a major component of growth for the country’s healthcare industry (9). The Indian pharmaceutical market was estimated at $18.4 billion in 2012 and is expected to almost double by 2016. Although India’s market is currently dominated by generic drugs, rising incomes, enhanced medical infrastructure, and insurance coverage could provide a valuable opportunity for manufacturers’ higher-priced branded healthcare products moving forward.
Key market challenges and considerations
Regulatory. Similar to many other countries, India’s medical regulatory structure is divided between national and state authorities. The Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) is the national authority responsible for the regulation of pharmaceuticals. The DCGI registers all imported drugs, new drugs, and biologicals in selected categories and has responsibility for approving clinical trials and quality standards in the country. Recently, these standards have come under question by FDA, citing quality-control problems ranging from data manipulation to sanitation. While FDA and regulatory bodies in other countries step up inspections of Indian plants in response to these developments, global manufacturers have had to reassess their contracted relations with these plants and give careful consideration to developing new strategic partnerships in this country moving forward (10).
Concerns over quality and data integrity have also impacted manufacturers’ perception of India’s clinical trials system. India’s large and diverse patient pool and low drug trial costs have made the country an attractive destination for multinational pharmaceutical clinical trials. However, India has recently seen the number of clinical trials fall dramatically among allegations that protocols were not being conducted properly and that companies were taking advantage of disadvantaged patients (11). In response to these developments, manufacturers have been forced to either shift their trials to another country or encounter significant delays in clinical trial approval--both of which are holding their organizations back.
Market access and pricing. The high prevalence of self-pay generic drugs throughout the country has created little incentive for the development of certain market access disciplines such as health economics and outcome research (HEOR) and reimbursement. Government affairs and pricing functions, on the other hand, play an important role and have been broadly cited as the most crucial challenges global manufacturers face in the Indian marketplace.
India’s National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) controls product pricing throughout the country. In 2013, the NPPA expanded the National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM) to include 652 drugs, a substantial increase over the 74 drugs previously listed. These products will now be subject to price controls that are projected to reduce prices by more than 20% for half the drugs (12). As if this did not challenge manufacturers enough, the Indian government recently decided to revise the NLEM later this year in response to complaints that the list should include all dosages, strengths, delivery mechanisms, and combinations of these previously identified drugs (13). The NPPA is also allowed to control prices of patented drugs that lie outside this list, and last month the government began exploring the possibility of using a reference pricing system for these products (14). With intense generic competition already driving down drug prices in India, these additional controls pose a significant threat to international manufacturers’ ability to generate revenue.
Intellectual property. Aside from pricing, patent protection has also come under the microscope as of late. In an effort to ensure greater accessibility to higher-cost, branded drugs, India, as well as other BRIC countries, has begun to allow generic-drug manufacturers to market these drugs at dramatically reduced costs without consequence through compulsory licenses. While only one compulsory license has been approved by India’s government to date (Bayer’s Nexavar), other manufacturers have recently had their patents weakened, revoked, or rejected. While appeals to some of these rulings are still in process, precedents have been set, leading manufacturers to question their future investment in India.
Implications for successful market entry
Despite the aforementioned challenges, major pharmaceutical companies recognize the long-term prospects of this market and continue launching new patented drugs and pursuing unique business opportunities in India. To encourage future investment, the government has made tax breaks available to the pharmaceutical sector, including a weighted tax deduction of 150% for any R&D expenditure incurred. In addition, the government recently declared that all drugs that offer some form of innovation would be exempt from price regulation for the first five years following approval. Here, innovation refers to drugs or drug delivery systems that arise from native R&D efforts or existing drugs that are improved upon by an Indian company. This measure is aimed to spur growth in the domestic pharmaceutical market and to ensure that pricing regulations do not turn global manufacturers away from India. Thus, companies that develop strategic partnerships with local businesses and outsource some of their R&D and manufacturing activities will be well-positioned to maximize revenue by avoiding steep price cuts. This opportunity for manufacturers will only apply, however, for those products that offer true innovation by providing economic and/or clinical value.
Uncertainty over patent security and obstacles to clinical trials are discouraging Western companies from conducting drug research in India. With that said, the government has already initiated clinical research reform efforts through new amendments and regulations that could quickly restore the growth of clinical trials throughout the country. At the same time, there is speculation that a transfer of power in India’s upcoming election could dampen fears of additional compulsory licenses (15). Manufacturers should closely monitor these internal developments and react accordingly.
Moving forward
A growing middle class that is projected to see a significant rise in noncommunicable diseases provides an excellent opportunity for global companies to launch their premium products and expand their market share. India’s underdeveloped insurance industry and high poverty rates, however, require that manufacturers first develop a careful pricing strategy. Pricing products appropriately can go a long way towards ensuring future growth as well as avoiding disputes over patent protection and licensing agreements. In a country that holds about one-fifth of the world’s population, India’s market is too big for pharmaceutical companies to shy away from, despite all of the hurdles placed in front of them.
Monday 12 May 2014
Defending India’s patent law
Prabha Sridevan in The Hindu
No one can attack India’s well-founded Intellectual Property regime as being weak merely because a drug that is claimed to be an invention fails the test of law
India and its intellectual property (IP) laws have been the subject of sharp criticism recently. Now, there is talk of the government invoking emergency provisions with regard to Dasatinib, a cancer drug. The decibel level may go up several notches.
Let us look at our law. The sovereignty of a country includes its power to make laws. Any person who pursues commercial interests in another country must submit himself/herself to the laws of the country. No one can attack our regime as being weak only because his/her invention did not stand up to the test of our legislation. Nor can India be accused of robbing Peter to pay Paul. It sounds romantic, but it is still robbery.
The Novartis case and the Nexavar case of compulsory licence (CL) are what have impelled this attack. Innovation and invention have speeded up in myriad ways in the last few decades and our country had committed itself to the obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Therefore, it was necessary for India to revisit its patent law; in 2005, the Indian Patents Act was amended, Section 3(d) being one of the amendments. It was the basis of the Novartis case.
TRIPS recognises that members have the right to use/adopt measures to protect public health so long as they are consistent with TRIPS. A recent study notes: “Policy makers in developing and developed countries need to base their implementation of intellectual policy rules on these pro-public health and pro-access principles.” The Doha Declaration is an affirmation of the right to use the flexibilities in TRIPS, especially by developing and less developed countries, regarding access to medicine. The language of the Doha Declaration emphasises the importance of implementing and interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in a way that supports public health.
“The TRIPS agreement does not limit the grounds on which compulsory licences can be granted, and does not prevent patent applicants from having to demonstrate enhanced efficacy for their allegedly new and useful inventions. There are many problems affecting access to and rational use of medicines in India but the provisions within the country’s patent laws, if more extensively and properly applied, should help rather than hinder such access. India’s laws and experiences could provide a useful example for low-income and middle-income countries worldwide.”
About patentability, not price
In Novartis, the Supreme Court said that while harmonising the patent law in the country with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, India had attempted to balance its obligations under the international treaty and its commitment to protect and promote the public health considerations of people in the country and elsewhere. The ‘thorn in the flesh’ Section 3(d) had been challenged by Novartis before the Madras High Court earlier. But the court upheld its constitutionality and rejected the attack on the grounds of vagueness and arbitrariness. Novartis did not file an appeal against that judgment. Novartis claimed a patent for Gleevec, a cancer drug which was refused. Novartis then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The intellectual property of the inventor lies in the invention which is claimed to be novel, inventive and patentable. The patent is a creature of law by which the state bars public access to that invention for a fixed period. The economic reward from the invention is earned during this time after which it goes to the public domain. Section 3(d) is a test of patentability. With reference to Gleevec, it is enough to know that 3(d) inter alia says that in the absence of evidence of enhancement of known efficacy, the mere discovery of a new form of a new substance is not an invention deserving the grant of patent. Imatinib Mesylate was the known substance and Novartis claimed a patent for its (the substance) beta-crystalline form.
The Supreme Court asked: “Now, when all the pharmacological properties of beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate are equally possessed by Imatinib in free base form or its salt, where is the question of the subject product having any enhanced efficacy over the known substance of which it is a new form?” If an invention fails the 3(d) test, it means there was no inventive step. There was no intellectual property in the alleged invention, and nothing that could be stolen. Our lawmakers meant to check any attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious grounds, and blocked attempts to keep an invention “evergreen.” If those who attack the Indian patent regime claim that a minor tweaking of chemicals is a giant step forward for an invention, then our legislators begged to differ. The Supreme Court said that it was not ruling that all incremental innovations were non-patentable and that every case would be examined. Our law says that new forms of known substances which do not have enhanced efficacy are in effect advances without real innovation. Therefore, Section 3(d) is actually a catalyst for genuine inventions.
The Supreme Court said that Novartis had attempted to get a patent for a drug which would otherwise not be permissible under our law. Filtering doubtful patents is the strength of our law and not its weakness. The Novartis judgment was not about price but about patentability.
Let us look at the compulsory licence (CL) case, i.e. Bayer vs. NATCO. The mechanism of CL is essentially about balancing patent rights with access to medicine. The words “social and economic welfare,” “public health,” “national emergency” and “public health problems/crises” used in the Act are all pointers to the CL provisions being centred around access to medicine.
A CL is granted subject to three conditions; one of them is about price. The reasonable requirement of the public with regard to the invention should be satisfied. The price at which it is made available should be reasonably affordable. It should be worked in India. A CL may be granted if the answer is a “no” to any of the three conditions. The interpretation of the word “working” by the Controller-General was criticised. It is incorrectly projected that the CL was granted on this score alone. Bayer failed in the other two tests. As far as working is concerned, the question is this: should the inventor manufacture the invention locally or is it sufficient to import it? The Controller held that “working” meant local manufacture to a reasonable extent. The Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) said that “working” could in some cases mean local manufacture entirely, while in others, only importation, and that it would depend on the facts and evidence of each case. “Working” is not defined in the Act. This issue will be settled by the superior courts on review. The power of review by the superior courts is sufficient to show that our law provides for safeguards.
Compulsory licence
Even in the U.S., it is believed that CL would be a beneficial addition to its patent system, would not significantly impact the incentives for innovations, and that, “a compulsory licensing provision would ensure that the American public is adequately supplied with a product. If the patentee is unable to produce enough supply to meet the demand for the product, another producer should be able to license the product to meet the demand.” This is precisely what our law says!
In all these years, there has been only one instance of the grant of compulsory licence. In fact it was refused recently for Dasatinib, the drug that is now in the news. And Section 3(d) has been invoked by our patent office only rarely. If Gleevec was refused a patent, it is only because it failed the test of Indian law. Refusal is not an act of robbery, for it means there was no invention and hence no property in the first place. There is really no case made out for there being a weakness in Indian law. The pharmaceutical industry’s anxiety behind the clamour against Indian law cannot be on account of any inherent weakness in our law, but only because other countries will follow it.
(Prabha Sridevan is a former judge, Madras High Court.)
Sunday 11 May 2014
Pfizer's bid for AstraZeneca shows that big pharma is as rotten as the banks
Global pharmaceutical companies are dodging the risks by loading R&D costs on to taxpayers
Every one of Pfizer’s patented drugs benefited from decades of taxpayer funds. Photograph: Canadian Press/Rex
Countries around the world are seeking long-run, innovation-led growth in the "real economy". This is born of a wish to move away from speculative growth led by short-term financial markets. For this reason, industrial policy is back on the agenda after years of being a near blasphemy.
The life-sciences industry is top of the list, for both Barack Obama and David Cameron, of "real" industries to nurture through such policy. But this month they have been reminded of an uncomfortable truth: big pharma is just as sick as the banks. And, like speculative finance, it is hurting taxpayers in the process.
Pfizer wants to buy AstroZeneca, a British firm, to cuts its high overheads and especially to pay the lower UK tax rate (20%) – the cheap way the UK attracts "capital"– rather than the 40% US tax rate. This is nothing new as Google and Apple have been shifting profits around the world to avoid tax. Even within the US, Apple moved one of its subsidiaries to Reno, Nevada to avoid paying higher tax in Cupertino, California. Let's call it a race to the bottom.
What makes this dynamic particularly problematic for the taxpayer is that the knowledge behind Apple and Pfizer products – the key to their long-run profits – has been virtually bankrolled by that same taxpayer. As I discuss in my book The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Private vs Public Sector Myths, every technology behind the iPhone was publicly funded (internet, GPS, touch-screen, Siri) and every one of Pfizer's patented drugs benefited from decades of taxpayer funds through the US National Institutes of Health, which in 2012 alone spent £32bn (£19bn).
Indeed, Pfizer's recent shift of one of its largest R&D laboratories from Sandwich in Kent to Boston was not due to the lower taxes or regulation in Boston but to be closer to this pot of gold. Coming back to the UK only to suck more blood out of the system should warn the government of the kind of image it wants to present of itself. Is it happy to be played front and back?
And what is happening to big pharma's research and development? In the name of "open innovation" – the admission that most of their knowledge comes from small biotech and large public labs – big pharma have been closing down their own R&D (reducing total numbers of researchers), as well as moving the remaining ones to be close to those labs.
Big pharma is no longer in the innovation business, using its own resources to fund the high-risk ideas, most of which will fail. It has become more risk-averse and prefers to focus on the D of R&D and please shareholders. Mergers and acquisition strategies reduce expensive overheads and costs (of which research infrastructure is the highest).
Things become even clearer when we look at the numbers behind one of their biggest expenditures: share buybacks. These are geared to boost stock prices, stock options and executive pay. Indeed it is this type of dynamic that has been driving the extreme inequality described by Thomas Piketty. The calculations of Professor William Lazonick suggest that in 2011, along with $6.2bn paid in dividends, Pfizer repurchased $9bn in stock, equivalent to 90% of its net income and 99% of its R&D expenditures.
While the justification for such buybacks is often that there are no "opportunities for investment", the increased public funds in pharma research shows who is funding the opportunities and who is free-riding. Though in the end both lose since without an engaged private partner, innovation suffers.
To make matters worse, these "innovative" companies advising governments on their "life-sciences" strategies are constantly seeking handouts through R&D tax credits, or more recently through the UK Patent Box tax scheme introduced in 2013 (as well as in the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain, and soon in the US), with a 10% tax for income earned on patented drugs.
Patents are already monopolies with 17 years' protection. There is no reason to increase profits even more during that time. Especially as what drives the research that leads to patents is not the "cost" of the research, but the opportunities that are perceived—historically driven by large amounts of risk-loving public funds.
Experts from the Institute for Fiscal Studies have argued that this policy will diminish government revenue by about £2bn a year, and have no effect on business investment in research – which was meant to be the point. Indeed, private investment tends to follow well-funded public investments, that are of course undermined by the constant bashing away at the ability of government to collect tax revenue. This not an innovation strategy but a City-like speculation strategy.
The parallel goes even further: just like the banks, big pharma socialises the risk, but privatises rewards. The few drugs that are coming out would not have emerged without taxpayer-funded research. Yet the taxpayer then pays twice: first for the research then for the high prices, justified by the supposedly high risk that big pharma is taking on. This is almost surreal: what risk? And what about taxpayer risk?
Rather than empty words on a life-sciences strategy, what is needed is for policymakers to become more confident in their negotiations with business. The 1980 Bayh-Dole act that allowed publicly funded research to be patented says that government should have a say on the prices of the drugs. The fact government has never exercised this right shows who has the upper hand.
But things can change. Innovation policy should be linked to corporate governance – why should companies that spend more on share buybacks than R&D benefit from public research funds? Then "intelligent" R&D tax credits could be created, linked not to the income generated from R&D but the research labour hired to conduct it (as introduced in the Netherlands).
Government could also retain a golden share of the intellectual property rights (patents) which public research produces, and/or make sure that the prices of the new drugs reflect how the taxpayer paid for the most high-risk research. And, finally, given the high dependence of the industry on publicly -funded R&D, do not allow acquisitions that undermine the underlying research base the companies themselves should commit to - and for which they constantly request handouts.
In short, we need to start fostering a more symbiotic innovation eco-system. It's time to put an end to the current, increasingly parasitic one. We could start by realising that government does have power to actively shape and create markets, and not just fix broken ones.
Friday 2 May 2014
Big Pharma, my cancer patient and me
My patient was refused compassionate access to a cheap chemotherapy. Why? Because pharmaceutical companies are often guilty of selling an ethically murky kind of hope
After failing two types of chemotherapy for advanced cancer, my patient knew that her lease on life was short, but a cherished family event stood in the way. "My son is going to propose at the Christmas table, I just want to make it there." Her son has been her anchor throughout her challenge; I could see why his engagement mattered so much. But Christmas was still some months away, and I feared the feat will be difficult.
"I am not afraid to die but I just want to know that I gave it my all." This is an all too frequent exchange, unfailingly poignant, often heart-wrenching. An entirely reasonable answer would be to gently reiterate the lack of meaningful chemotherapy, broach the benefit of good palliative care, and allow for regret at both our ends. Contrary to popular belief that mythologizes every patient raging against cancer to the very end, for many this discussion eases the burden of expectation and allows for a peaceful end.
But this relatively young mother was simply not ready yet. "I would happily die right after he proposed" she smiled, reminding me that her goalposts had never changed. When a patient like that looks you in the eye, it isn’t easy to separate foreboding statistics and human longing into two neat piles and deny hope.
My head said that another chemotherapy drug wouldn't make a significant survival difference. But my heart urged me to try, if not to boost survival, then merely to reassure her that she gave it her best shot. Put simply, we both knew that the gesture will be more therapeutic than the drug itself, hardly a rare observation in medicine.
I wrote to a large pharmaceutical company for compassionate access to a common chemotherapy that’s not government subsidised for her precise type of cancer (most likely because patients typically don’t live long enough to need it). It is a relatively old and cheap drug, importantly with manageable toxicity, and I requested a month’s supply to gauge response. I added that the patient does not expect recurrent funding in case she responds to the drug, addressing a legitimate concern. In a world where we frequently push the boundaries or prescribe chemotherapy in more questionable circumstances, I feel comfortable that what I am really doing is asking the company to be my partner in nurturing hope. Which is after all what every pharmaceutical representative has told me for as long as I have known.
So I simply don’t believe it when my request is declined. Thinking this to be a mistake, I protest further up the chain, pointing out to a senior executive that only recently the company had offered me conference sponsorship worth thousands more than the small cost of the chemotherapy. The apologies come fast, but the explanations are notably absent.
My naive puzzlement slowly turns into the realisation that almost every instance where a company has facilitated compassionate access to a product, it has been as a form of marketing as a means of gaining lucrative, government-subsidised listing. In the era of astonishingly expensive blockbuster drugs, government subsidisation is the holy grail of big pharma. The cost of treating a few hundred or even a few thousand patients for free (and in the process, securing the backing of doctors), is negligible when the ultimate prize is full government subsidy. Indeed, individuals and organisations including the UK’s NICE and Australia’s PBS are now questioning the feasibility of subsidising drugs that can cost as much as AU$200,000 a year for ambiguous benefit.
Compassionate access schemes for these incredibly expensive drugs might facilitate access for selected patients but they are not truly compassionate in the way that the average person understands. Pharmaceutical companies sell an ethically murky kind of hope than what doctors and their patients might understand. The benefit to the company must ultimately outweigh the benefit to the individual patient. If subsidy looks unlikely, access schemes are retired, sometimes abruptly. When a commonplace drug is neither vying for market recognition nor fighting for subsidisation, there is no incentive to provide it to a patient like mine, whose story would anyway never be the stuff of headlines.
You might ask the obvious question as to why it would take so long for an oncologist to figure out that a pharmaceutical company is not a charity. The common argument is that companies must necessarily recoup the cost of drug development, as only a small minority succeed in the marketplace.
But for every dollar spent on research, nearly twice is spent on lobbying and marketing – and it is also this expense that companies want to recover. From the time they are students, doctors are exposed to relentless advertising that big pharma is their companion in healthcare. The glory days of advertising saw doctors offered egregious forms of largesse, from conferences hosted in ancient castles and on cruises to lavish dining and entertainment. Then there were the rivers of pens post-it notes, stress balls and cute toys to influence prescribing. Regulation is much tighter today, but there is still plenty of money in sponsorships, paid speaking tours, adding one’s credible name to journal articles, and just promoting a drug to one’s peers, especially if you are anointed a key opinion leader.
Drug companies think nothing of sending a representative to wait for three hours in a clinic to spend five minutes with a doctor. Unlike other people, these people never ever express frustration at the ludicrous wait and are unfailingly courteous. They ask subtly about you, your family and your holidays. They probe your prescribing habit and tell you why your peers prefer their drug. They routinely ask what would make it even easier for you to prescribe their drug. It is impossible to navigate the discussion towards cost or what makes for the greater societal good.
And to be honest, it’s unseemly to be anything but polite towards someone who has waited hours to see you, seems genuinely nice, and from whom you might need a favour for your next patient. These favours are rare but the younger you are, the more impressionable. No wonder many medical schools and hospitals have banned pharmaceutical representative visits, hopefully signalling to doctors that the sandwiches have a hidden cost.
Eventually, I tell my patient that my request for compassionate access was denied. Crushed, she asks if she wasn’t important enough. "That’s not true", I say unconvincingly, "it’s just the way it is." She dies, with a few weeks to go before Christmas, leaving me to wonder whether the drug might just have bridged the small gap. I will never know, but feeling morally compromised by the whole exchange, I tell the drug company that I won’t see its representatives in future.
I didn’t expect an acknowledgment but when it came, it sounded like a thinly veiled warning that the visits were an essential prerequisite to receiving favours. An incredulous representative exclaims, "you would really do that, stop seeing us due to what happened with that one patient?"
But "that one patient" represented the human face of what happens when the interests of a patient and the pharmaceutical company don’t align. That one patient’s crushed hope felt no less important than the renewed hopes of another. What happened with that one patient finally opened my eyes to what has gone before.
It seems only right to start by paying tribute to my patient, while acknowledging my complicity in the thorny tangle of doctors, patients and drug companies.
Thursday 10 April 2014
What the Tamiflu saga tells us about drug trials and big pharma
We now know the government's Tamiflu stockpile wouldn't have done us much good in the event of a flu epidemic. But the secrecy surrounding clinical trials means there's a lot we don't know about other medicines we take
Tamiflu capsules. Photograph: Per Lindgren/REX
Today we found out that Tamiflu doesn't work so well after all. Roche, the drug company behind it, withheld vital information on its clinical trials for half a decade, but the Cochrane Collaboration, a global not-for-profit organisation of 14,000 academics, finally obtained all the information. Putting the evidence together, it has found that Tamiflu has little or no impact on complications of flu infection, such as pneumonia.
That is a scandal because the UK government spent £0.5bn stockpiling this drug in the hope that it would help prevent serious side-effects from flu infection. But the bigger scandal is that Roche broke no law by withholding vital information on how well its drug works. In fact, the methods and results of clinical trials on the drugs we use today are still routinely and legally being withheld from doctors, researchers and patients. It is simple bad luck for Roche that Tamiflu became, arbitrarily, the poster child for the missing-data story.
And it is a great poster child. The battle over Tamiflu perfectly illustrates the need for full transparency around clinical trials, the importance of access to obscure documentation, and the failure of the regulatory system. Crucially, it is also an illustration of how science, at its best, is built on transparency and openness to criticism, because the saga of the Cochrane Tamiflu review began with a simple online comment.
In 2009, there was widespread concern about a new flu pandemic, and billions were being spent stockpiling Tamiflu around the world. Because of this, the UK and Australian governments specifically asked the Cochrane Collaboration to update its earlier reviews on the drug. Cochrane reviews are the gold-standard in medicine: they summarise all the data on a given treatment, and they are in a constant review cycle, because evidence changes over time as new trials are published. This should have been a pretty everyday piece of work: the previous review, in 2008, had found some evidence that Tamiflu does, indeed, reduce the rate of complications such as pneumonia. But then a Japanese paediatrician called Keiji Hayashi left a comment that would trigger a revolution in our understanding of how evidence-based medicine should work. This wasn't in a publication, or even a letter: it was a simple online comment, posted informally underneath the Tamiflu review on the Cochrane website, almost like a blog comment.
The UK government spent £0.5bn stockpiling Tamiflu. Photograph: Hanodut/EPA
Cochrane had summarised the data from all the trials, explained Hayashi, but its positive conclusion was driven by data from just one of the papers it cited: an industry-funded summary of 10 previous trials, led by an author called Kaiser. From these 10 trials, only two had ever been published in the scientific literature. For the remaining eight, the only available information on the methods used came from the brief summary in this secondary source, created by industry. That's not reliable enough.
This is science at its best. The Cochrane review is readily accessible online; it explains transparently the methods by which it looked for trials, and then analysed them, so any informed reader can pull the review apart, and understand where the conclusions came from. Cochrane provides an easy way for readers to raise criticisms. And, crucially, these criticisms did not fall on deaf ears. Dr Tom Jefferson is the head of the Cochrane respiratory group, and the lead author on the 2008 review. He realised immediately that he had made a mistake in blindly trusting the Kaiser data. He said so, without defensiveness, and then set about getting the information needed.
First, the Cochrane researchers wrote to the authors of the Kaiser paper. By reply, they were told that this team no longer had the files: they should contact Roche. Here theproblems began. Roche said it would hand over some information, but the Cochrane reviewers would need to sign a confidentiality agreement. This was tricky: Cochrane reviews are built around showing their working, but Roche's proposed contract would require them to keep the information behind their reasoning secret from readers. More than this, the contract said they were not allowed to discuss the terms of their secrecy agreement, or publicly acknowledge that it even existed. Roche was demanding a secret contract, with secret terms, requiring secrecy about the methods and results of trials, in a discussion about the safety and efficacy of a drug that has been taken by hundreds of thousands of people around the world, and on which governments had spent billions. Roche's demand, worryingly, is not unusual. At this point, many in medicine would either acquiesce, or give up. Jefferson asked Roche for clarification about why the contract was necessary. He never received a reply.
Then, in October 2009, the company changed tack. It would like to hand over the data, it explained, but another academic review on Tamiflu was being conducted elsewhere. Roche had given this other group the study reports, so Cochrane couldn't have them. This was a non-sequitur: there is no reason why many groups should not all work on the same question. In fact, since replication is the cornerstone of good science, this would be actively desirable.
Then, one week later, unannounced, Roche sent seven documents, each around a dozen pages long. These contained excerpts of internal company documents on each of the clinical trials in the Kaiser meta-analysis. It was a start, but nothing like the information Cochrane needed to assess the benefits, or the rate of adverse events, or fully to understand the design of the trials.
Packets of Tamiflu in a drawer at a German pharmacy. Photograph: Wolfgang Rattay/Reuters
At the same time, it was rapidly becoming clear that there were odd inconsistencies in the information on this drug. Crucially, different organisations around the world had drawn vastly different conclusions about its effectiveness. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) said it gave no benefits on complications such as pneumonia, while the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said it did. The Japanese regulator made no claim for complications, but the European Medicines Agency (EMA) said there was a benefit. There are only two explanations for this, and both can only be resolved by full transparency. Either these organisations saw different data, in which case we need to build a collective list, add up all the trials, and work out the effects of the drug overall. Or this is a close call, and there is reasonable disagreement on how to interpret the trials, in which case we need full access to their methods and results, for an informed public debate in the medical academic community.
This is particularly important, since there can often be shortcomings in the design of a clinical trial, which mean it is no longer a fair test of which treatment is best. We now know this was the case in many of the Tamiflu trials, where, for example, participants were sometimes very unrepresentative of real-world patients. Similarly, in trials described as "double blinded" – where neither doctor nor patient should be able to tell whether they're getting a placebo or the real drug – the active and placebo pills were different colours. Even more oddly, in almost all Tamiflu trials, it seems a diagnosis of pneumonia was measured by patients' self-reporting: many researchers would have expected a clear diagnostic algorithm, perhaps a chest x-ray, at least.
Since the Cochrane team were still being denied the information needed to spot these flaws, they decided to exclude all this data from their analysis, leaving the review in limbo. It was published in December 2009, with a note explaining their reasoning, and a small flurry of activity followed. Roche posted their brief excerpts online, and committed to make full study reports available. For four years, they then failed to do so.
During this period, the global medical academic community began to realise that the brief, published academic papers on trials – which we have relied on for many years – can be incomplete, and even misleading. Much more detail is available in a clinical study report (CSR), the intermediate document that stands between the raw data and a journal article: the precise plan for analysing the data statistically, detailed descriptions of adverse events, and so on.
By 2009, Roche had shared just small portions of the CSRs, but even this was enough to see there were problems. For example, looking at the two papers out of 10 in the Kaiser review that were published, one said: "There were no drug-related serious adverse events", and the other doesn't mention adverse events. But in the CSR documents shared on these same two studies, 10 serious adverse events were listed, of which three are classified as being possibly related to Tamiflu.
Roche HQ in Basel, Switzerland. Photograph: Bloomberg/Bloomberg via Getty Images
By setting out all the known trials side by side, the researchers were able to identify peculiar discrepancies: for example, the largest "phase three" trial – one of the large trials that are done to get a drug on to the market – was never published, and is rarely mentioned in regulatory documents.
The chase continued, and it exemplifies the attitude of industry towards transparency. In June 2010, Roche told Cochrane it was sorry, but it had thought they already had what they wanted. In July, it announced that it was worried about patient confidentiality. By now, Roche had been refusing to publish the study reports for a year. Suddenly, it began to raise odd personal concerns. It claimed that some Cochrane researchers had made untrue statements about the drug, and about the company, but refused to say who, or what, or where. "Certain members of Cochrane Group," it said, "are unlikely to approach the review with the independence that is both necessary and justified." This is hard to credit, but even if true, it should be irrelevant: bad science is often published, and is shot down in public, in academic journals, by people with good arguments. This is how science works. No company or researcher should be allowed to choose who has access to trial data. Still Roche refused to hand over the study reports.
Then Roche complained that the Cochrane reviewers had begun to copy in journalists, including me, on their emails when responding to Roche staff. At the same time, the company was raising the broken arguments that are eerily familiar to anyone who has followed the campaign for greater trials transparency. Key among these was one that cuts to the core of the culture war between evidence-based medicine, and the older "eminence-based medicine" that we are supposed to have left behind. It is simply not the job of academics to make these decisions about benefit and risk, said Roche, it is the job of regulators.
This argument fails on two fronts. First, as with many other drugs, it now seems that not even the regulators had seen all the information on all the trials. But more than that, regulators miss things. Many of the most notable problems with medicines over the past few years – with the arthritis drug Vioxx; with the diabetes drug rosiglitazone, marketed as Avandia; and with the evidence base for Tamiflu – weren't spotted primarily by regulators, but rather by independent doctors and academics. Regulators don't miss things because they are corrupt, or incompetent. They miss things because detecting signals of risk and benefit in reviews of clinical trials is a difficult business and so, like all difficult questions in science, it benefits from having many eyes on the problem.
While the battle for access to Tamiflu trials has gone on, the world of medicine has begun to shift, albeit at a painful pace, with the European Ombudsman and several British select committees joining the push for transparency. The AllTrials campaign, which I co-founded last year, now has the support of almost all medical and academic professional bodies in the UK, and many more worldwide, as well as more than 100 patient groups, and the drug company GSK. We have seen new codes of conduct, and European legislation, proposing improvements in access: all riddled with loopholes, but improvements nonetheless. Crucially, withholding data has become a headline issue, and much less defensible.
Last year, in the context of this wider shift, under ceaseless questions from Cochrane and the British Medical Journal, after half a decade, Roche finally gave Cochrane the information it needed.
So does Tamiflu work? From the Cochrane analysis – fully public – Tamiflu does not reduce the number of hospitalisations. There wasn't enough data to see if it reduces the number of deaths. It does reduce the number of self-reported, unverified cases of pneumonia, but when you look at the five trials with a detailed diagnostic form for pneumonia, there is no significant benefit. It might help prevent flu symptoms, but not asymptomatic spread, and the evidence here is mixed. It will take a few hours off the duration of your flu symptoms. But all this comes at a significant cost of side-effects. Since percentages are hard to visualise, we can make those numbers more tangible by taking the figures from the Cochrane review, and applying them. For example, if a million people take Tamiflu in a pandemic, 45,000 will experience vomiting, 31,000 will experience headache and 11,000 will have psychiatric side-effects. Remember, though, that those figures all assume we are only giving Tamiflu to a million people: if things kick off, we have stockpiled enough for 80% of the population. That's quite a lot of vomit.
Roche has issued a press release saying it contests these conclusions, but giving no reasons: so now we can finally let science begin. It can shoot down the details of the Cochrane review – I hope it will – and we will edge towards the truth. This is what science looks like. Roche also denies being dragged to transparency, and says it simply didn't know how to respond to Cochrane. This, again, speaks to the pace of change. I have no idea why it was withholding information: but I rather suspect it was simply because that's what people have always done, and sharing it was a hassle, requiring new norms to be developed. That's reassuring and depressing at the same time.
Should we have spent half a billion on this drug? That's a tricky question. If you picture yourself in a bunker, watching a catastrophic pandemic unfold, confronting the end of human civilisation, you could probably persuade yourself that Tamiflu might be worth buying anyway, even knowing the risks and benefits. But that final clause is the key. We often choose to use treatments in medicine, knowing that they have limited benefit, and significant side-effects: but we make an informed decision, balancing the risks and benefits for ourselves.
And in any case, that £500m is the tip of the iceberg. Tamiflu is a side show, the one place where a single team of dogged academics said "enough" and the company caved in. But the results of clinical trials are still being routinely and legally withheld on the medicines we use today and nothing about a final answer on Tamiflu will help plug this gaping hole.
Star anise provides the principal component of Tamiflu. Photograph: Adrian Bradshaw/EPA
More importantly, for all that there is progress, so far we have only sentiment, and half measures. None of the changes to European legislation or codes of conduct get us access to the information we need, because they all refer only to new trials, so they share a loophole that excludes – remarkably – all the trials on all the medicines we use today, and will continue to use for decades. To take one concrete and topical example: they wouldn't have made a blind bit of difference on Tamiflu. We have seen voluntary pledges for greater transparency from many individual companies – Johnson & Johnson, Roche,GSK, now Roche, and more – which are welcome, but similar promises have been given before, and then reversed a few years later.
This is a pivotal moment in the history of medicine. Trials transparency is finally on the agenda, and this may be our only opportunity to fix it in a decade. We cannot make informed decisions about which treatment is best while information about clinical trials is routinely and legally withheld from doctors, researchers, and patients. Anyone who stands in the way of transparency is exposing patients to avoidable harm. We need regulators, legislators, and professional bodies to demand full transparency. We need clear audit on what information is missing, and who is withholding it.
Finally, more than anything – because culture shift will be as powerful as legislation – we need to do something even more difficult. We need to praise, encourage, and support the companies and individuals who are beginning to do the right thing. This now includes Roche. And so, paradoxically, after everything you have read above, with the outrage fresh in your mind, on the day when it feels harder than any other, I hope you will join me in saying: Bravo, Roche. Now let's do better.
Wednesday 5 March 2014
India's activist role in breaking the pharmaceutical patent monopolies
Ritu Kumar in The Indian Express 4 March 2014
Recently, there were rumours that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) was getting ready to announce “trade enforcement actions” or sanctions against India over its intellectual property rights regime. The Obama administration has been under pressure from the US Chamber of Commerce and lobby groups, like the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, to take a tough stance against Indian rulings that have vetoed several multinational pharmaceutical company patents.
The lobbyists are pushing for India to be classified as a “priority foreign country”, a label associated with the worst offenders of patent law. The row blew over, but not before the USTR had filed a case at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against India’s domestic content requirements for its solar programme.
In the last few years, the Indian government and judiciary have taken up major cases on patent protection for life-saving cancer drugs. Novartis’s drug Glivec was denied patent protection by the Supreme Court and India granted a compulsory licence to Bayer’s drug Nexavar, which treats kidney and liver cancer.
Compulsory licences are a provision in international patent norms, including the WTO’s TRIPS agreement, under which a government permits someone else to manufacture the patented product without the consent of the patent owner, usually to lower prices of life-saving drugs and increase access to them.
This is not the first time that India has taken a strong stance in the pharmaceutical patent wars. In 2001, Indian generic manufacturers played a crucial role in slashing prices of anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs used against HIV, bringing down the cost of the drugs per patient per year from around $15,000 to about $300. Today, the cost of ARV drugs is as low as $60 per patient per year. This remarkable achievement was only possible because at the time, India was not party to WTO agreements on patent protection.
Indian generic manufacturers were able to disregard patents, and ended up supplying over 80 per cent of all ARV drugs purchased in the world. India was recognised as playing a leading role in providing quality healthcare to people in developing countries.
It is evident that India’s role in the pharmaceutical patent wars has great implications for poor people’s access to healthcare, not just at home but around the world. Emerging economies like Brazil and South Africa follow the Indian model when they modify their intellectual property laws in order to bar awards to frivolous and obvious patents, and to allow pre-and post-grant challenges. For instance, Brazil’s proposed changes to its patent policy quote provisions in India’s Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005. Doctors Without Borders, meanwhile, has publicly encouraged South Africa to borrow from India when drafting its new patent policy.
With markets in the developed world becoming saturated, multinational drug companies are increasingly looking to emerging economies with large populations for sales expansion and growth. However, their model of intellectual property protection as an incentive for innovation is running into obstacles in low- and middle-income countries. Supporters of the pharmaceutical industry believe that without patent protections, there will be no breakthrough innovations and no new life-saving technologies.
They argue that the high costs of research and development for new drugs can only be compensated by patent monopolies that allow expensive drug prices. Yet, developing economies are keen on providing affordable healthcare products for their citizens. The developed world itself is beset with unsustainable rising healthcare costs and is looking for cost-effective innovation. A reassessment of patent monopolies, especially in the case of life-saving products, is essential if healthcare access is to be broadened beyond wealthy patients.
Some new models of incentivising medical research are being proposed. Since large funds are required for the development of new medical technologies, scholars have proposed the creation of attractive prizes, along the lines of the XPrize, which was instituted to encourage space exploration by giving successful teams up to $10 million in awards. The idea behind prizes is that the winning team receives a large one-time payment, but it cannot patent the solution, which ensures that the technology remains in the public domain.
Other models of funding innovation have already seen success in the marketplace, such as the public-private partnership that created a new rotavirus vaccine. This vaccine, called Rotavac, is now sold in India and other developing countries by Bharat Biotech, at profit, for about $1 per dose.
Millions of patients are suffering from many other poorly managed or untreatable diseases, such as diabetes or dengue fever. They would greatly benefit if companies were incentivised to create therapies at affordable prices that were widely accessible. India must not slow the pace of developing new therapies, nor shy away from the difficult work of making healthcare available to all. The rest of the world is watching.
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